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Abstract 
Globalization has led to a precarization of labour, which especially manifests in the unstable 
working conditions, a lower labour share in national income as well as in a growing income 
inequality, with the exception of some countries with high initial income inequality. The 
neglect of concern for employment and inequality in the formulation of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 is noted; the addition of a goal for full employment in a 
reformulation of the MDGs in 2005 did not lead to a change in focus in official development 
assistance (ODA). If the growing concern for employment and inequality is taken seriously, a 
refocus of development efforts is necessary, combining a greater share of development 
assistance for employment and productivity enhancing activities with a change in national and 
international economic and financial policies, so as to make employment creation (together 
with poverty reduction) an overarching goal. 
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1 Introduction 
Employment, especially decent and productive employment, has recently become more 
topical in the world of development and development co-operation. A recent indication of 
this are the events related to the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011. In only a few months various Arab 
regimes have been toppled by a population, not only wanting more democracy, but perhaps 
even more importantly, especially by educated youth, wanting good jobs and the prospects of 
advancement in life. Yet this turmoil took place in countries which scored well on progress in 
the by aid donors much hailed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: MDG progress ranks and other indicators, selected countries 
 
Country 
MDG progress rank 
2010 
Youth unemployment 
2009 
GDP pc 
2008 
pc GDP growth 
1970-2008 Inequality 
Egypt  6 24.7   (2007) 1991 2.5 32.1 
Tunisia  1 30.6   (2005) 3903 3.1 40.8 
Jordan  6 26.9 3596 1.6 37.7 
      
Brazil 5 15.5 8205 2.2 55.0 
Vietnam 6   4.6   (2004) 1051 4.2 37.8 
 
Source: CGD (2011), ILO (2011). 
 
Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Jordan, are among the eight best performing countries with 
respect to progress in the MDGs. However despite this progress on Human development, 
youth unemployment was higher than in other countries, such as Brazil, and Vietnam, with 
different levels of development but similar achievement in MDG progress to these 
Mediterranean countries. 
 
After the change in regimes in various Arab countries in the spring of 2011, the leaders of 
UNDP and other development agencies quickly retorted that something must be done about 
employment. Helen Clark, the administrator of the UNDP, declared in an article entitled 
‘Jobs, Equity and Voice: Why Both Economic and Political Inclusion matter in the Arab 
world’ (Huffington Post, 7 April 2011) that: 
 
Inclusive growth in the middle income countries in the Arab States region must also 
include strategies to generate decent jobs in higher value-added sectors, for which 
revamped tertiary education and skills training can educate people. The mismatch 
between the supply of university graduates and the type of jobs available is deeply 
dispiriting for those who cannot find suitable work. 
 
However it was not only in the context of the events unravelling in the Arab world that the 
view that employment had to become one of the major aims of development, if not the major 
aim, was increasingly expressed. The devastating earthquake in Haiti engendered a massive 
increase in aid. Yet in a review of developments in Haiti, Fukuda-Parr (2009) argues that in 
delivery of aid to Haiti all efforts were concentrated on humanitarian aid and longer-term 
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provision of social services, but that the aid donors had little or no understanding of the need 
to stimulate jobs and growth as a means of advance for the population in general. 
 
While social investments are important, they are not sustainable without investment in the 
productive base of the economy. Social services are essential for the fulfillment of human 
rights to education, to healthcare, and social security and a massive investment in these 
sectors is still needed. But the current allocations are unbalanced; economic growth is 
needed for the fulfillment of the human rights to housing, to food, and productive work. 
The growth pillar of the national poverty reduction strategy (DSNCRP or PRSP) is only 
financed by 20 per cent and is not included in the programmes of major donors such as the 
UN system. 
 
It should be recalled that employment issues were notably absent from the MDGs when these 
were formulated in 2000. In a recent volume on employment, and inequality,1 Mkandawire 
(2011) and Amsden (2011) argue that the neglect of attention to employment issues resulted 
from too much focus on poverty alleviation. 
 
Amsden (2011) remarks that: 
 
To slay the dragon of poverty, deliberate and determined investments in jobs above 
starvation wages must play a central role, whether for self-employment or paid-
employment. The grass roots approach to solving poverty doesn’t go far enough, 
because it aims only at improving the supply side of the labour market, making job 
seekers more capable, and not the demand side, making new jobs available for them. It 
acts as though new ways of earning a living emerge (at a positive wage) simply because 
the supply of job seekers is better clothed, housed, and fed, or enjoys more human 
rights—which is the same fallacious reasoning behind Say’s Law… Employment 
generation is different from poverty alleviation because it has a concept behind it, 
‘capital’. This means that the labour market is influenced by, and influences, all flows 
through the savings-investment nexus, including accumulation, distribution and 
innovation. It is at the heart of political conflict. Multi-faceted policies, therefore, are 
required to promote employment growth, from fiscal and monetary, to industrial and 
trade. Poverty alleviation has its policy rages, too, but they’re more confined, outside 
the capital accumulation process. Still, the co-ordination of policies to create 
employment in the Third World’s most impoverished regions is not impossible even if 
it is multifaceted. Excellent work in the 1970s was produced on the subject, only to be 
shelved in the 1980s for political reasons. 
 
Mkandawire (2011) concurs in observing that: 
 
Politically underpinning this has been the social differentiation since independence and 
the accompanying ideological shifts that have contributed to the shift in focus of state 
policies away from social and employment policies. 
 
Amsden proposes therefore: 
 
… to revolutionize foreign aid by tying it to jobs. For every dollar spent on poverty 
alleviation, a dollar should be spent in the poorest regions on employment creation, 
                                                
1 van der Hoeven (2011). 
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following the lead in rural employment generation established by China and Taiwan. 
Some aid donors could concentrate on the investment part of the project and other 
donors, with hands on experience in business, could provide technical assistance on 
what is likely to work. Instead of buying a US$100 laptop computer, developing 
countries could start competing with a US$95 dollar one’ 
 
However, five years after the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals, the World 
Summit 2005 outcome document contains a reference (paragraph 47) to employment issues: 
 
We strongly support fair globalization and resolve to make the goals of full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young 
people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies as well as 
our national development strategies, including poverty reduction strategies, as part of 
our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. These measures should also 
encompass the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, as defined in 
International Labour Organization Convention No. 182, and forced labour. We also 
resolve to ensure full respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work. 
 
This paragraph in the 2005 Summit Outcome document led to the inclusion of a new sub-goal 
in 2007 (under MDG1): 
 
Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and 
young people, with four indicators: 
 
  i) Growth rate of GDP per person employed; 
 
 ii) Employment-to-population ratio; 
 
iii) Proportion of employed people living below US$1 (PPP) per day; and 
 
iv) Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment. 
 
This addition has been welcomed by organizations like the ILO, NGOs, trade unions and 
various governments as it could give these organizations a handle to bring employment issues 
more forcefully into the discussion of development, development goals and aid delivery. 
However some criticize the inclusion of a goal for full employment, as it is not easy to 
measure and thus deviates from the intentions behind the original MDGs (Vandemoortele 
2011). 
 
Such criticism though reflects the somewhat ambivalent role the MDGs are playing, in the 
current development discourse, namely that originally the MDGs were designed to set, 
measure and monitor goals for some important aspects of development, without prescribing a 
concomitant development trajectory, so that all countries could agree with the goals without 
being obliged to adhere to the same policy prescriptions; something developing countries had 
become very wary of since the introduction of the structural adjustment policies in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Yet, despite the intention of not having an underlying prescribing development 
theory, the MDGs have paradoxically led to a situation where those issues that were not 
explicitly mentioned in the MDGs, like employment, consequently received less attention 
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from the development aid community as a result.2 So in that respect it is understandable and 
justifiable that full employment has been added as one of the (sub) goals of the MDGs. 
 
But this leaves many questions open as to how to implement the goal. In recent discussions 
there has been a growing consensus that, although the goal of full employment has now been 
established, too little co-ordinated effort has been undertaken to achieve it. For example, a 
recent review of the MDGs (UNDG 2010), five years after the inclusion of the (sub) goal of 
employment in the MDGs, reports on the progress or regress in employment issues globally 
as well as in some countries by means of a number of employment indicators. It also gives 18 
narratives of how particular development projects have contributed to more or better 
employment in individual countries. The examples include successes of employment 
schemes, training schemes for entrepreneurs, training schemes for unemployed youth, 
improved collective bargaining, social security etc. However looking at the different 
examples chosen in this review, it is not always clear how development aid in general has 
contributed to more and or better employment. Most of the examples do not make use of any 
counterfactual analysis or even mention whether other schemes mutatis mutandis were also 
contributing to employment creation.  
 
Notably absent is any macro analysis of the effects of total volumes of aid on growth and its 
possible impact on employment. It thus remains difficult to distil from the 2010 outcome 
review how successful development and development aid efforts have been in respect to 
creating more and better employment. It remains equally difficult to distill from the DAC 
statistics how aid flows in general have contributed to employment creation. 
 
What statistics3 have made clear is that the share of ODA commitments for the social sector 
(3-year moving averages) has greatly and steadily increased: from 16 per cent in 1990 to 34 
per cent at the time of the introduction of the MDGs in the year 2000 to over 40 per cent in 
2008, mainly driven by substantial increases in the share of ODA commitments to 
government and civil society and to a lesser extent to health, education and population 
programmes (Figure 1). Commitments to economic, to production activities as well as to 
multi-sectoral activities all declined over the same period. In all major developing countries 
groupings ODA commitments to social sectors were 42 per cent or higher in 2009 (Figure 2). 
 
These ODA statistics relate to the traditional ODA donors. New donors like China and India 
almost certainly have a higher share of their aid in infrastructure, transport, mining etc. 
(Figure 3) (see also The Economist, ‘Charity begins abroad, new sources of aid’, 13 August 
2011). These aid flows and projects may in the long-run add to new capacity and to greater 
generation of jobs, although in the short-run the employment effects might be quite limited or 
even offset domestic employment creation, as projects are often undertaken by contractors 
and even by temporary imported workers from these donor countries. These flows are 
currently still considerably smaller than the flows from the traditional DAC countries, but are 
increasing faster than traditional ODA and therefore in the future may change the current 
trend of ODA, which is increasingly benefitting the social sectors. 
 
 
  
                                                
2 A recent example, for instance is the way DFID has analysed the ‘effectiveness’ of different UN 
organizations. 
3 (OECD DAC online, consulted 13-09-2011). 
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Figure 1: ODA to developing countries by sector: ODA by sector since 1990 (as a percentage of total 
ODA, 3–year average commitments 
 
 
 
Source: OECD-DAC secretariat online database; © OECD. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: ODA to developing countries by sector: ODA by region and by sector in 1990 (as a 
percentage of total ODA committed for each region 
 
 
 
Source: OECD-DAC secretariat online database; © OECD. 
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Figure 3: Sectoral distribution of concessional loans from China (by end of 2009) 
 
 
 
Source: Information Office of the State Council, The People's Republic of China, 2011. China's 
Foreign Aid, Figure 1 April 2011, Beijing. 
 
These changes in sectoral allocation cannot prima facie be taken as an indication of whether 
more or less attention is paid to employment in development aid. Aid programmes to the 
social sectors could, on the one hand, by increasing human capital and governance, very well 
contribute indirectly to increases in the quality of employment and to increased employment 
creation, but, on the other hand, by shifting resources away from investment in infrastructure 
and capital they might well lead to reduced growth of production and thus lower 
employment. 
 
Hence we have to decompose the question of development aid efforts for employment into 
the following string of questions. Does aid contribute to growth and poverty alleviation? 
Does growth contribute to employment creation? And can aid interventions, while 
contributing to growth, be made to contribute more specifically to employment creation? 
Related to the first question, there is currently a debate as to whether aid in general does 
contribute to growth (Arndt et al. 2010). Furthermore, in the current context of integrated 
markets and globalization, it is not helpful, to discuss the effectiveness of aid in the absence 
of considerations of related issues of international governance and coherence in development 
and other policies.4 
 
This paper discusses therefore first, how globalization is leading to more precarious forms of 
work through an overview of some major employment trends over the last 20 years,5 this is 
followed by a discussion of which (national and international) employment policies seem to 
be warranted in the light of these trends of precarization. A final section discusses how 
development aid can support these employment policies. 
                                                
4 The examples of the negative effects of cotton subsidies in the USA on cotton farmers and workers in Mali 
and of the deindustrializing effects in developing countries of the economic partnership programmes (EPA) 
proposed by the EU. See South Centre (2012) The EPAs and Risk for Africa, Local Production and Regional 
trade, SC/TDP/AN/EPA/30, Geneva. 
5 We will therefore not look at the effects on employment of development aid in developed or donor 
themselves, although this may be an important issue in the political discourse on development aid. 
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2 Employment trends6 
The ongoing process of globalization has resulted in many countries in a growing 
precarization of labour,7 which we illustrate through six labour market trends: 
1. declining employment population ratio,  
2. the increase in service employment, 
3. the continuing high share of workers in the informal economy, 
4. the declining wage share and greater income inequality,  
5. growing importance of multinational enterprises and  
6. the growing number of migrant workers in industrialized countries. 
2.1 A decline in the employment to population rate for most regions in the world 
 
For the world as a whole, the employment-to-population ratio seems to have remained rather 
constant, but there are important regional differences. All three Asian regions (East, South-
East, and South) (73.8, 67.5, 58.7 per cent, respectively) and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had 
the highest employment-to-population ratio at the beginning of the 1990s, but experienced 
declines by several percentage points between then and 2009 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Employment to working age population ratio 1991-2008: various regions in the world 
 
 
Source: ILO, Trends Econometric Models, July 2010. 
In contrast, the employment-to-population ratio increased slightly from much lower levels in 
the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America. The lower employment-to-population level 
in these regions at the beginning of the 1990s can be explained by (very) low female labour 
                                                
6 This section draws on van der Hoeven (2010). 
7 See for example recent issues of the World of Work report published annually by the ILO. 
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force participation. At the global level, we notice two opposing trends, namely an increased 
ratio for female labour force participation and a decline of male participation (Figure 5). The 
first trend can be ascribed to changes in customs and norms, and the second one more to 
deterioration in employment opportunities as consequence of globalization.  
 
Figure 5: Male employment to working age population ratio 1991-2008: various regions in the world 
 
Source: See Figure 4. 
2.2 Changing pattern in production 
 
For the world as a whole, the percentage of employment in the service industry has risen 
from 33.6 per cent in 1991 to 43.8 per cent in 2008. A high service sector share in 
employment already prevailed in developed countries, the Middle East, and North Africa 
where we consequently see small increases of around 9.5, 2.5, and 2 percentage points, 
respectively. However a massive increase in this share took place in East Asia, where it 
almost doubled from 19.5 to 35.7 per cent, and in South Asia, where it increased from 23.6 to 
30.1 per cent (Figure 6). 
 
Some analysts interpret the increase in the employment in the service industry as an 
indication of post-industrial society and as such an important indicator of progress in 
development. This fails to recognize that the service industry encompasses a wide range of 
activities, from hawking and peddling in the street to sophisticated financial services. 
Therefore a better indicator of development for developing countries is the size of the 
manufacturing sector. Here we notice differing trends over the last two decades (Figure 7). At 
the world level, the share of employment in industry has hardly changed between 1991 and 
2008, remaining at 21.5 per cent. But there are again important regional differences. The 
most dramatic increase is in South-East Asia and the Pacific, where the share increased from 
12.7 per cent in 1991 to 19.4 per cent in 2000, and in South Asia where it increased, over the 
same period, from 15.4 to 22.4 per cent, thereby almost reaching the share in East Asia, 
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Figure 6: Percentage employment in services 1991-2008: various regions in the world 
 
Source: See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 7: Percentage employment in industry 1991-2008: various regions in the world 
 
Source: See Figure 4. 
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where the share has remained more or less constant over the period (around 23.5 per cent, 
with a dip of 3-4 percentage points around 1998 due to the Asian crisis). Noticeably are the 
very low and stagnant share in SSA (at around 8.5 per cent) and a declining share in North 
Africa. 
 
It should be noted however that the share of employment in industry could even 
underestimate the level of progress in industry. As Rada and Taylor (2006) note, industry 
often has high productivity (or a low employment value-added elasticity). An important issue 
is therefore not only the size of employment in industry but also how the surplus generated in 
the industrial sector is used for reinvestment and how it is distributed in the rest of the 
economy.  
2.3 The increases of non-standard forms of employment 
 
In developing countries, the important element of precariousness is most clearly manifested 
in the existence of a pervasive ‘informal sector’ in the economy or the ‘informal economy’.8 
This phenomenon is not restricted to poor developing countries, as Figure 8 shows. 
Figure 8: Informality and economic development 
 
Note: The graph plots deciles of GDP per capita levels (in PPP) against the average size of the 
information sector in the informal employment database used in IILS informality database. 
Source: ILO (2009). 
The existence of the informal economy is partly related to the changes in the structure of 
employment: especially for the poorer regions, the increase of employment in the service 
sector reflects an increase in the share of workers engaged in informal activities. Figure 9 
indicates clearly this pervasiveness of the informal sector in Latin America and Southeast 
Asia. Despite increases in per capita income in these regions, quite substantial in the case of 
Asia, the size of the informal sector has not declined, but rather increased.  
 
  
                                               
8 It has become common to speak about the ‘informal economy’ rather than the ‘informal sector’, as 
increasingly informal activities take place within established enterprises. It would thus be a misnomer to 
continue to speak about the informal sector.  
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Figure 9: Informal employment and GDP in Latin America and South East Asia 
 
Note: Graphs based on un-weighted averages of countries in OECD (2009). 
Source: UNDP (2008: 8). 
There are however contradictory explanations of the pervasiveness of the informal sector. 
Some (e.g. Maloney 2004) argue that the size of the informal sector is determined by the 
degree of labour market inflexibility. According to them, the more inflexible the labour 
market, the greater the preference of employers to avoid employing workers formally and the 
more an inclination to act informally. Others (e.g. Kucera and Roncolato 2008) argue that the 
major cause of the informal sector activities is the lack of formal jobs. This interpretation has 
gained ground in ILO, OECD, and other UN organizations. 
 
There is evidence of a clear link between the increase in non-standard work and income 
inequality (Rani 2008), mainly due to widening wage differentials between standard and non-
standard jobs. Some would explain this by the low education level of those engaged in the 
informal sector, as statistics show. But it is most likely the type of job rather than the 
educational attainment, which drives inequality. An increase in education levels will result in 
better educated workers in the informal economy without a major decline in wage inequality 
in the absence of newly created formal jobs.  
2.4 A declining wage share and the growing wage inequality 
 
ILO (2008) reports that the wage share declined over 1995-2007 in two thirds of the 
developing countries, including the major ones, as well as in the major developed countries 
(Figure 10). The only exception was the Latin American region, where some countries 
witnessed an increasing wage share. The ILO report attributes the declining wage share to 
increasing trade and globalization and confirms earlier research findings (see Diwan 2001 
and Harrison 2002) that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that sees the labour share in 
GDP as relatively constant, the proportion of GDP that goes into wages and other labour 
income varies over time. Using a data set from 1960 to 1997, Harrison (2002) splits her 
sample (of over 100 countries) into two even groups (based on 1985 GDP per capita). Her 
data show that, in the group of poorer countries, labour’s share in national income fell on 
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Figure 10: Increasing and declining (75% countries) wageshare 1995-2007 
 
Source: ILO (2008). 
 
average by 0.1 percentage point per year from 1960 to 1993. The decline in the labour share 
accelerated after 1993, to an average decline of 0.3 percentage points per year. In the richer 
sub-group, the labour share grew by 0.2 percentage points prior to 1993, but fell by 0.4 
percentage points per year since then. Thus there was a trend reversal for richer countries 
post-1993, and an acceleration of an already downward trend for the poorer sub-group.  
 
Harrison (2002) tested for factors that could explain changes in labour shares, combining 
detailed national accounts data from the United Nations with measures of trade openness, 
capital account restrictions, and capital flows. Overall, the results suggest that changes in 
factor shares are primarily linked to changes in capital/labour ratios. However, measures of 
globalization (such as capital controls or direct investment flows) also play a role. Harrison 
found that frequent exchange rate crises lead to declining labour shares,9 suggesting that 
labour pays a disproportionately high price when there are large swings in exchange rates 
(i.e., wages are more severely affected than GDP). Capital controls are associated with an 
increase in the labour share, an effect that Harrison attributes to the weaker bargaining 
position of capital vis-à-vis labour, if the cost of relocating production increases with capital 
controls. Foreign investment inflows are also associated with a fall in the labour share. The 
weak bargaining position of labour in contexts of open capital accounts is also a causal 
mechanism explored by Lee and Jayadev (2005). They find that financial openness exerts a 
downward pressure on the labour share both in developed and developing countries for the 
period from 1973 to 1995. Harrison also finds that increasing trade is associated with a fall in 
the labour share. This result is robust across specifications. These results point to a systematic 
negative relationship between various measures of globalization and labour’s share in GDP. 
 
Diwan (2001) reports, based on a large sample of countries, an average drop in the labour 
share of GDP in each crisis of 5 percentage points, and a modest catch-up thereafter. In the 
three years after the crisis, labour shares were still 2.6 percentage points below their pre-crisis 
average. Given the fact that most countries have undergone more than one crisis, the 
cumulative drop in the wage share over the last 30 years is estimated at 4.1 per cent of GDP, 
and is especially large for Latin America, where the share dropped by 6.7 per cent between 
the 1970s and the 1990s. The overall decline in the labour share is partly explained by what 
                                               
9 Labour shares decreased with a real devaluation but in the recovery did not return to pre-devaluation levels. 
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some call the ratchet effect: After an economic shock or a financial crisis, the labour share in 
gross national income decreases and does not recover when national income recovers (van 
der Hoeven and Saget 2004).  
 
However not only has the inequality between wages and other components of gross domestic 
product increased, but the distribution among wage earners has also worsened. The ratio of 
the average wage of the top ten per cent wage earners in relation to the bottom ten per cent is 
found to have increased in seventy per cent of the countries (Figure 11). Here also, one 
notices similar regional differences, an almost uniform pattern for most regions, but a mixed 
pattern for Latin America.  
Figure 11: Growing inequality in 70% of countries, inequality between top and bottom wage earners 
has increased since 1995 
 
Source: ILO (2008). 
2.5 The internationalization of the production process 
 
Today there are some 82,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) with 810,000 affiliates in the 
world. These companies play a major role in the world economy. For instance, exports from 
foreign affiliates of TNCs are estimated to have grown from about a quarter of total world 
exports of goods and services in 1982 to one-third in 2007. And the number of people 
employed by these corporations has increased fourfold since 1982, standing at about 77 
million in 2008, implying a much faster rate of growth than that of the labour force. These 
TNCs are dominated by a smaller number of large firms. The largest 100 TNCs account for 
11 per cent of all employment in TNC and for about 4 per cent of world GDP. Over the last 
15 years, the largest TNCs have undergone a rapid process of internationalization (Figure 
12). There has also been a progressive increase in the proportion of companies operating in 
the service sector and of TNCs based in developing countries (UNCTAD 2009: 17-18). 
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Figure 12: Annual growth of employment, value added and exports, transnational enterprises, 1986-
2007 
 
Source: Figures based on UNCTAD (2009: Table 1.6). 
2.6 International migration 
 
Global figures of migration do not show a substantial change: in 1960 the stock of total 
migrants in the world population was 2.7 per cent and in 2005 this percentage had not 
changed.10 This has led some commentators to argue that globalization is characterized by 
increased capital flows and increased trade and service flows but not increased labour flows. 
However this characterization is misleading. If one looks at more disaggregated (by region) 
figures, one clearly sees a growing trend in some regions. In Europe, the stock of migrants as 
part of the population increased from 3 per cent in 1960 to 8.8 per cent in 2005. The same 
ratio increased from 6.7 to 13.6 per cent in Northern America, from 13.5 to 16.4 per cent in 
Oceania, and from 4.9 to 37.1 per cent in the Gulf States. By contrast, the ratio of the stock of 
migrants to the local population declined in Africa, Asia and Latin America as a whole 
(Figure 13). The increase in the share of migrants in the local population in developed 
countries is quite substantial; despite the severe restriction most of these countries have put 
on inward migration.  
 
This increased level of migration is leading to tensions in receiving countries but is providing 
an increasing source of foreign exchange for the sending countries. Figure 14 indicates that 
for many developing countries remittances represent a much larger flow than development 
assistance. For example, in East Asia and the Pacific in 2007, in per capita terms, remittances 
stood at US$34 per capita compared with US$5 ODA flow. Analogous figures for Latin 
America and the Caribbean are US$114 and US$10, and for South Asia US$33 and US$6. 
Only in SSA, was the per capita inflow of remittances (US$26) lower than that of ODA 
(US$39). 
 
  
                                                
10 This figure excludes the former Soviet Union as after the independence of the former soviet republics 
remaining soviet citizens are counted as migrants. 
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Figure 13: Migrants as percentage of population 
 
Source: UNDP (2009), Statistical Annex Table 1. 
 
Figure 14: Workers remittances as % GDP, various regions, 1988-2007 
 
Source: World Bank (2009). 
Using a broad definition, the World Bank estimates that remittances to developing countries 
amounted to US$166.9 billion in 2005, compared to US$85.6 billion in 2000 and US$31.2 
billion in 1990 (World Bank 2005: 88). Remittances are not only a rapidly growing source of 
external finance, but they are generally steady across years and not prone to sudden reversals 
of direction (Sirkeci et al. 2012). They tend to be counter-cyclical to crises in developing 
countries (i.e. migrants send more money home to support their families) and hence help to 
smooth consumption volatility.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The trends described above all point to a growing precarization of labour. This is especially 
the case for the decline in labour participation rates in many regions, the declining wage share 
and the growing wage inequality, as well as the continuing informalization of the labour force 
and the slow progress of structural change in many countries. Growing employment in 
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multinational enterprises and their subsidiaries as well as growing in migration in some areas 
of the world and growing workers remittances have not been able to arrest the growing 
precarization.  
3 Policies for employment creation 
In the light of the trends just elucidated, particularly the ‘precarization’ of the labour market, 
we briefly discuss national policies as well as types of enabling international environment 
which are conducive to employment creation, in order to pave the way for the discussion on 
the nature of development aid interventions which might support such policies. 
 
In discussing (national) policies for employment creation, it is important to distinguish 
between short-term (macroeconomic) policies and longer-term structural policies. The first 
basically should strive11 for full capacity utilization, so that all productive forces, including 
labour, can be fully engaged in the production process, while the second should strive for the 
expansion of capacity and an increase in the employment content of growth, to the extent that 
increasing the employment content of growth does not jeopardize growth itself. (Or at least 
that it does not jeopardize growth to such an extent that the economy arrives at a declining 
growth and employment trajectory.) 
 
It should be noted that this distinction between the short-term and long-term policies for 
growth and employment creation were very much on the mind of the original architects of the 
Bretton Woods system in 1945, to the extent that the IMF and emergency funds of the UN 
were responsible for assisting and guiding shorter term policies and the World Bank and the 
specialized agencies of the UN for longer-term policies. However since the debt crisis of the 
1980s and the ensuing structural adjustment policies (now labelled Poverty Reduction 
Strategies), the picture has become more complex. However in order to get a clear picture 
how different elements of development aid could better contribute to employment creation it 
is better in the first instance to maintain the analytical distinction between the short term and 
long term. 
 
Although the question of the relation between development aid and employment was posed in 
the terms of employment, it is also important to qualify the term employment. 
 
In assessing outcomes of employment policy it is necessary to consider not only the quantity 
of employment but also the quality of employment, as in poorer countries most people cannot 
afford to be unemployed and have to be engaged in whatever survival mechanisms are 
possible. Statistics show that people in higher income classes have higher unemployment 
rates than people in poorer income classes (Ghose et al. 2008). Hence we have to introduce 
some quality considerations. Often quality of employment is measured either by whether 
incomes among the self-employed or wages among employees exceed a certain level, or by 
the existence of a minimum level of secondary benefits such as social security and access to 
legally binding employment contracts. A combination of these three measures is also often 
applied. Terms used to describe those with adequate quality of work then are ‘good jobs’, 
‘decent work’ or whether a worker or self employed person belongs to the ‘working poor’ or 
not. So it is necessary to consider both employment creation and the quality of employment 
when assessing how development aid contributes to employment creation.  
                                                
11 It may not be possible to get full use of all productive forces given fixed factor proportions in the short run. 
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3.1 Shorter-term policies for employment creation: some illustrative examples 
 
In developed countries policy debates on employment over the last 30 years have been 
dominated by the so-called NAIRU, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment.12 Given that many governments put the control of inflation as the most 
important instrument of short-term macroeconomic policy, the NAIRU becomes the target 
unemployment rate. A major problem with the NAIRU, however, was and is that it varies 
substantially, between 3 and 7 per cent in the USA, and another is that the NAIRU is 
subjected to hysteresis: after a period of (financial) crisis the NAIRU is estimated to be 
higher than before the crisis (Ball 2009). This has led to too slow and too limited macro-
policy reactions to increasing unemployment in many developed countries. The influence of 
the NAIRU, and the dominance of inflation corrections rather than employment creation as 
the principle aim of macroeconomic policy, has also taken hold in policy prescriptions for 
many developing countries (Freeman 2007). In this section we will therefore argue, through 
three examples, that such a policy stance is not appropriate and that greater concern for 
employment creation is good macroeconomic policy. 
The first example of short-term policies for employment creation is in the realm of 
macroeconomic policy. The World Bank has over the last years become more concerned with 
growing inequality and has devoted various research publications to this. One example is a 
study on monetary and exchange rate reforms (Conway 2005). It opens with a reference to 
the so-called ‘policy trilemma’ of international economic policies (see Mundell 1963; Cohen 
1993; Obstfeld et al. 2004). This states that national economic policy space is circumscribed 
by the impossibility of pursuing the following three policies simultaneously: open capital 
account, fixed exchange rates, and independent monetary policy. The trilemma posits that 
only two out of these three policies can be combined. For example, under a system of an open 
capital account and fixed exchange rates, countries cannot pursue an independent monetary 
policy, for example to stimulate employment growth, since interest rates are determined by 
world interest levels. Conversely, if countries need to undertake an independent monetary 
policy, they have either to revert to flexible exchange rates or opt for a closed capital account.  
The policy restrictions posed by this trilemma do hamper policies for full employment. But 
the policy trilemma, which has guided policy makers for several decades, and is still guiding 
a majority of macroeconomists, can be relaxed by avoiding the rigid two-corner solutions 
referred to above, for example by looking beyond the traditional opposing alternatives of 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates, or open versus closed capital accounts, to adopt 
intermediate options in these three policy domains—like a capital account management 
through the selective application of capital controls, or a managed real exchange rate (see 
Bradford 2004).13 
Although, much like any other policy instrument, capital controls have, much like any other 
policy instrument, not always been fully effective in reaching their stated objectives (see 
Ariyoshi et al. 2000), they have contributed to regaining greater policy autonomy in several 
                                                
12 See for example, Ball (2009). 
13 For example, in the case of China, research from the IMF argues that making the quasi-fixed exchange rate 
more flexible would allow the country to pursue a more independent monetary policy. The same paper also 
argues for a cautious approach to capital account liberalization, given the institutional weaknesses of China’s 
financial system (see Prasad et al. 2005). The argument could be extended to many other developing 
countries. Rather than abandoning capital controls altogether, they should remain a policy tool that can be 
used selectively. 
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cases. In Chile, for example, controls imposed on inflows have helped to reduce their level 
and to change the composition of inflows towards longer maturities, hence increasing the 
autonomy of monetary policy (Gallego et al. 1999; see also de Gregorio et al. 2000). The 
more controversial issue is controls on outflows, but Edison and Reinhart (2001) argue that 
such controls enabled Malaysia to stabilize exchange rates and interest rates during the East 
Asian crisis and to gain more policy autonomy. Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) conclude that the 
Malaysian approach has led to a faster economic recovery and to a smaller decline in real 
wages and employment than IMF policies would have done.  
 
How could a system of a managed real exchange rate, the second element mentioned earlier, 
stimulate employment? Rodrik (2003) and Frenkel (2004) provide three channels. Active 
management of the real exchange rate would allow for higher capacity utilization in times of 
unemployment, if applied in combination with the appropriate mix of macroeconomic and 
fiscal policies. It would also stimulate output growth and hence employment, if combined 
with appropriate industrial policies, as the experience in various Asian countries has shown. 
It could shift the sectoral composition of exports towards more labour intensive goods, and 
hence increase the employment elasticity of the economy as a whole. 
 
Employing a policy mix with intermediate options such as a managed capital account or a 
managed real exchange rate requires more fine-tuning and coherence in policies than relying 
on rule-of-thumb policy interventions. To achieve this requires national institutions, which 
have explicit mandates for employment and decent work to achieve this. 
 
Another possible, supplementary, element to relax the policy trilemma is to include one or 
two additional policy instruments to complement the fiscal and monetary tools (see also 
Tinbergen 1970 [1952]). Bradford (2004) suggests, for example, social pacts or co-ordinated 
wage bargaining to hold down inflation and so to ‘free up’ other policies aimed at growth and 
employment creation. Also, a greater concern for inequity and a reduction of national 
inequalities could contribute to reducing inflationary pressure and could be added either as 
part of a social pact or as a stand-alone policy instrument (see van der Hoeven and Saget 
2004). It is thus very important to have employment creation and equitable distribution as 
explicit policy objectives for macroeconomic policies.  
 
A second example of employment conscious short-term policies is that of considering central 
banks as agents of development as suggested by Epstein (2007). He argues that an 
employment-targeting approach to central bank policy may seem quite alien to those 
schooled in the orthodox tradition of inflation targeting and financial liberalization, but that in 
fact this has been quite common historically in both currently developed and developing 
countries. Over the years, central banks have been seen as agents of economic development, 
not just agents of economic stabilization. And while sometimes central banks have failed 
quite spectacularly in this mission, there have been other important success stories, including 
important periods in the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and India, to name 
just a few examples.  
 
As for developing countries, Amsden (2001, 2007) describes the key role that investment 
banks, in co-ordination with central banks, played in the industrialization success stories 
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brazil, Argentina and others, in mobilizing 
and directing savings to key industrial sectors, and in particular to those specializing in 
exports. Epstein (2007) recalls that in many of these cases, central banks were a key part of 
the government apparatus that played a supporting role by maintaining low interest rates, 
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maintaining capital controls to help stabilize exchange rates at competitive levels, and 
sometimes engaging in direct lending for preferred purposes. Engaging in these 
developmental roles, using a wide variety of instruments was widely seen as a key part of the 
central bank’s mission. After the Second World War, there was a major transformation of 
central banking in the developing world. In many respects, these changes paralleled those in 
the developed world. Epstein deplores the resilience of inflation targeting and argues that 
inflation targeting is far from benign as it creates in central banks a culture of inflation focus, 
or even inflation obsession.14 An explicit employment target as well as an inflation target 
could change the mind-set of traditional economists. 
 
A third example of shorter-term policies stimulating employment and decent work is that of 
setting minimum wages. Several ILO studies (Saget 2001, 2008) have observed that, as a 
consequence of structural adjustment and liberalization policies and a breaking down of trade 
unions and labour market institutions, the minimum wage in a sizeable number of countries is 
so low that it is does not contribute to reducing inequalities or poverty reduction and has in 
effect become meaningless. In a second set of countries, the minimum wages appears to 
fulfill its objective of reducing poverty without hampering employment creation.15 But there 
is also a set of countries where the minimum wage is very high: too high in fact to be 
considered as a genuine minimum wage, with the risk of hampering economic growth and 
thus longer-term employment creation. This is the so-called ‘maxi minimum wage’ (Saget 
2008). In this situation minimum wage policies amount more to average wage fixation than to 
fixing minimum wages. Poorly developed collective bargaining is often a driving factor 
behind the emergence of such ‘maxi minimum wages’; minimum wage consultations are the 
only forum where trade unions can make their demands known, with the danger that the 
resulting minimum wage is not a genuine threshold, but rather the actual wage earned by 
most formal workers. As is known from macroeconomic policy, one can only have as many 
policy instruments as policy goals: the minimum wage-setting machinery is expected to 
respond to too many policy goals (Saget 2008) and becomes an obstacle rather than an 
instrument for employment creation and decent work. The interesting conclusion is that both 
too low and too high minimum wages are an indication of malfunctioning employment and 
labour market policies. 
 
Misconceived (short-term) macroeconomic policies can prevent economies from achieving 
sustained growth and employment. Taylor (2009), gives various examples how stability in 
interest rates and foreign exchange can contribute to steady growth, but that, with increasing 
financial openness, pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies, especially for medium-sized and 
smaller economies, have become the rule rather than the exception affecting sustained 
growth. 
                                                
14 As Epstein (2007) notes: ‘Millions of dollars are spent studying every aspect of inflation, but few aspects of 
unemployment; thousands of hours of the time of highly scarce, skilled economists are spent pouring over 
complex models designed to show how to get inflation down from 8 to 4 per cent, but not on how to create 
more and better jobs; and if other government officials or those in civil society ask the central bank to do 
something about employment creation, the central banks can respond, ‘that’s not our job’. More than anything 
else, the cost of inflation-focused monetary regimes is to divert the attention of the some of the most highly 
trained and skilled economists and policy makers in developing countries away from the tasks that previous 
generations of central bankers took for granted as being their main job: to help their countries develop, to 
create jobs, and to foster socially productive economic growth’. 
15 It has been argued that the existence of minimum wages results in greater informal employment. ILO (1977) 
shows however that minimum wages up to 2/3 of the level of wages of unskilled workers will not produce 
substantial increases in informality. 
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3.2 Longer term policies for employment creation 
 
Having reviewed some of the short-term policies for employment creation we now turn to the 
long-term policies for employment creation. 
 
Although economic growth depends on many factors, one factor contributing to growth is 
structural change, a process where economic activity increasingly takes place in sectors with 
high value added, with diversification and sophistication of production. Although this process 
of structural change necessitates labour reallocation and can thus generate (frictional) 
unemployment, the higher value added created in the growth process results in higher 
incomes from wages and capital, which, together with increased demand from abroad, will 
lead to higher growth and employment. This virtuous picture can however be disturbed when 
structural change and expanded production and productivity increases in some sectors do not 
lead to higher national productivity. McMillan and Rodrik (2011), for example, argue that 
structural change in Asia has led to higher national productivity and growth, but that in Africa 
and Latin America, until recently, policies were based on capturing comparative advantage in 
primary products leading to lower labour productivity and lower growth, with negative 
consequences for employment and wages. Asian countries had, and have, an industrialization 
process in which industrial policies have been applied successfully, in contrast to Africa 
where industrial policies were mainly absent and in Latin America where, at least until 
recently, these policies, constrained by the legacy of the Washington Consensus, were not 
robust enough to be effective. The current debate is therefore not whether public policies for 
industrialization are useful or not, but which type of public policies will best work under 
which circumstances (Lin 2011). 
 
It is thus important to consider appropriate policies for structural change and well thought out 
industrial policies in a meaningful debate on employment creation. 
 
Melamed et al. (2011), based on the work of Khan (2007) and others, surveyed the literature 
on findings on the relation between growth, poverty and sectoral employment. In 24 growth 
episodes detailed information on growth and employment was available, and out of these in 
18 episodes, poverty decreased with rising employment in services and in manufacturing in 
most of them (see Table 2). The six cases where poverty increased or remained stable were 
mostly characterized by an absence of increases in employment in every sector. This analysis 
thus gives support for a link between growth and employment. However the link is far from 
robust and needs further research.  
 
Table 2: Growth, employment and poverty, a summary of evidence 
 
Source: Melamed et al. (2011); reproduced here by permission of ODI. 
 
  
Number of episodes Rising agricultural employment Rising industrial employment Rising services employment
Growth episodes associated with falling poverty rates
18 6 10 15
Growth episodes associated with no fall in poverty rates
6 2 3 1
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As argued above, policies for employment need to take into account both the quantity of 
employment and the quality of employment, or as Khan (2006), has put it: ‘policies for 
employment need to be concerned with the quantity of employment, the factor productivity of 
employment, the factor remuneration of employment and the terms of employment’. 
 
Ernst and Berg (2009) have conceptualized these policy concerns in what they call the 
virtuous circle of links between growth, employment and poverty reduction, namely 
economic growth, productive capacity, employment with rising productivity, higher incomes 
of the poor, greater investments in health, education and infrastructure leading to an 
empowering of the poor, all contributing again to economic growth (see Figure 15). However 
there are many obstacles for such a virtuous circle to become effective in practice. Policy 
interventions are needed to overcome these obstacles and to stimulate employment creation.  
 
Figure 15: Virtuous circle of links among growth, employment and poverty reduction 
 
Source: Ernst and Berg (2009); © OECD. 
Khan (2007) gives a useful overview of such policies. He distinguishes between the 
following six policy areas. 
The poor can escape working poverty when policies achieve a combination of the following: 
(a) an increase in wage employment; 
(b) an increase in the real wage; 
(c) an increase in self-employment;  
(d) an increase in productivity in self-employment; 
(e) an increase in the terms of exchange of the output of self-employment. 
 
However the poor face various constraints. One of the major constraints in the current 
context of globalization is a low output elasticity of demand for labour. Furthermore 
economic growth, often in combination with exports to advanced markets, often leads to a 
rate of growth in employment for which the poor do not possess the necessary skills. Also 
often in the context of structural adjustment programmes the employment impact of high 
growth is offset by a countervailing contraction of employment induced by economic reform. 
Another important factor is that growth might also fail to reduce poverty if the distribution of 
scarce productive resources is, and remains, highly concentrated. 
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In order to deal with these challenges various longer-term employment policies are 
suggested: first, rapid labour absorbing growth providing the poor with productive and 
reasonably well-remunerated employment; second, conversion of the poor in self-
employment into productive entrepreneurs; third an increase of productivity of poor workers 
both in wage and self-employment; fourth, labour market policies that improve and adjust 
the skill composition of the poor; fifth, macroeconomic policies that result in appropriate 
terms of exchange of the produce of the poor; sixth in some countries an orderly dismantling 
of past systems of inefficient excess employment in the public or semi-public sector, with 
appropriate compensation, rather than a disorderly and sudden dismantling; and seventh a set 
of economic and social policies which incorporate special programmes designed for 
households, which cannot cover their basic needs from proceeds of labour. 
The effect of growth on employment is sometimes measured by the concept of the 
employment elasticity of growth; that is say the percentage increase of employment that 
occurs with a one per cent increase in growth. Although various international reports use this 
concept, it is not without problems. First in many developing countries since people cannot 
afford to be unemployed or to withdraw from the labour force, the employment elasticity of 
growth measures labour force participation and does not give an indication of the quality of 
employment as all activities performed by the poor are generally included in the 
measurement of employment. Second, high employment elasticity in itself does not convey 
success of an employment policy. For example, a country with a high employment elasticity 
(close to one), whose GDP grows slowly say at e.g. 1 per cent a year clearly does worse than 
a country with an employment elasticity of 0.5 but whose GDP grows at 7 per cent per 
annum. So when the concept of employment elasticity is used it should be in conjunction 
with figures on growth and on the quality of the jobs created in different sectors and never as 
a single macroeconomic figure in itself. 
4 Aid and employment  
4.1 Introduction 
 
Putting together the trends in employment and in decent work and the required national and 
international policies to promote good outcomes, the question is to what extent can 
development aid and development aid policies contribute to such policies? 
 
However, it may be useful to note that according to earlier observers, aid often has actually 
had a negative impact on employment of the poor. The analysis of the path-breaking 
employment missions of the UN system in the 1970s pointed to a bias of aid against 
employment creation—e.g. 1972 Mission Report to Kenya for the International Labour 
Organization, see also Jolly (1973). Major conclusions of these missions were that 
development aid often financed imports, which made capital cheaper vis-à-vis labour. 
Imported technologies were often also labour replacing and big industries profited more than 
small industries from support and subsidies. Emphasis of aid was on urban areas to the 
detriment of rural areas, where most of the poor and underemployed lived. Some of these 
conclusions still hold true today, but in other cases aid donors have indeed shifted focus. But 
even this change in focus often has not dealt with some of the root problems of employment 
creation, in particular: first the need for investment to generate output and demand for 
employment; and second the distribution of profits emanating from productivity increases so 
that they can contribute to investment or increased wages to stimulate demand. Aid donors 
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often instead supported social expenditure and programmes for small enterprises, rather than 
dealing with the necessary structural changes needed for increased productive employment. 
Thus a clearer conceptualization of the link between the necessary policies on the one hand, 
to create employment and, on the other, the aid projects and policies to achieve this, is clearly 
needed. 
 
Table 3 summarizes potential policies directed towards the short-term objective of increased 
capacity utilization, and the longer-term objective of an increase in capacity, which might be 
supported by aid. 
 
This Table includes a number of policies that are favoured by current aid donors, but it also 
emphasizes policies for structural change and policies, which affect the demand side of the 
economy. This follows our analysis above and is in line with a recent observation by Taylor 
(2009) that orthodox economists in short-term macroanalysis place a great deal of emphasis 
on the supply side ignoring the demand side, and that in relation to longer-term development, 
conventional economic analysis favours letting markets work rather than supporting the 
policies for structural change and industrial capacity building.  
 
Table 3: Employment policies, which might be supported by development aid 
 
 Capacity utilization  Capacity increase 
Policies which might be 
supported by aid 
programmes and policies  
• Fiscal policies 
• Monetary policies 
• Exchange rate  
• Trade barriers 
• Unemployment 
benefits 
• Cash transfers 
• Public investment 
• Infrastructure 
• Industry policy  
• Education 
• Vocational and 
management training 
• Small enterprises 
• Health 
• Social security 
 
Source: Author. 
 
As one can observe the policies that influence employment creation and potentially interact 
with aid policies span a rather wide spectrum. As various analysts of structural patterns of 
development of successful countries have observed, a single general framework of 
development policy, like the Washington Consensus, does not exist in relation to policies to 
promote structural change. Policies need to be time and context specific, and calls for ‘best 
practice’ are often a sign of intellectual laziness.  
 
Therefore, in order to get a better appreciation of the possible and desirable interaction 
between employment policies and development aid, a more detailed analysis of some the aid-
employment relationships seems to be necessary, taking into account context specific 
situations (including stage of development) specific, as listed below:  
 
• The effects of aid in increasing demand in situations of under capacity and thus 
increasing employment. 
 
• The effects of aid and the Dutch Disease in changing the balance between tradeables 
and nontradeables and the consequences for employment. 
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• The effects of aid in increasing infrastructure and thus removing bottlenecks of 
production in order to create more employment. 
 
• The effects of aid in making capital more productive, with an ambivalent effect on 
quality and quantity of employment; 
 
• The effects of aid in supporting structural change towards economic activity in sectors 
with high value added, with diversification and sophistication of production, which 
has a positive effect on employment and on the remuneration of unskilled and skilled 
workers in the long run. 
 
• The role of aid in increasing education and hence human capital. 
 
• The effect of aid on health issues so as to make work more productive. 
 
• The effects of aid on social security to make workers more productive and willing to 
adjust etc. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has argued that in many countries the process of globalization has led to a 
precarization of labour, which is especially manifest in the unstable working conditions of 
many workers, in growing inequality between the labour share and the capital share in national 
income in more than 75 per cent of the countries in the world as well as in a growing income 
inequality and wage inequality in many regions in the world, with, however, the exception of 
some Latin American countries where inequality declined from very high initial levels at the 
beginning of the century and some countries in SSA and South-East Asia. The neglect of 
concern for employment and inequality in the formulation of the MDGs in 2000 and their 
consequent is noted; moreover, the addition of a goal for full employment in a reformulation 
of the MDGs in 2005 did not lead to a change in focus in Official Development Assistance. 
This paper argues that if the growing concern for employment and inequality is taken 
seriously, a refocus of development efforts is necessary, combining a greater share of 
development aid for employment and productivity enhancing activities with a change in 
national and international economic and financial policies, so as to make employment creation 
(together with poverty reduction) an overarching goal. 
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